Since the 1970s, Chile has exhibited a highly skewed income distribution accompanied with strong fluctuations over time. Although income distribution worsened notably in the 1970s-80s, a significant improvement was recorded in the first half of the 1990s, resulting from better economic and social policies in the return to democracy. Nonetheless, Chile still faces significant challenges to improve development. There must be an active macroeconomic policy focused on the real economy. Chile also needs profound microeconomic reforms, including (i) capital markets, developing long-term financing channels for small businesses; (ii) radical progress in quality of education and labour training; and (iii) vigorous public support for innovation.
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Introduction
Significant changes in poverty and income distribution have been recorded in Chile over the past four decades. Its evolution can be summarized in three phases as follows: first, in the 1970s and 1980s during Pinochet's dictatorship, income distribution deteriorated sharply, and the share of the population living below the poverty line rose to 45 per cent in 1987. The highest inequality level was also reported during that same year, and in particular there were regressive shocks associated with the economic crises of 1975 and 1982. Next, after democracy was reinstated in 1990, poverty was reduced substantially, and was 15 per cent of the population in 2009. Income distribution improved by the first half of the 1990s, but stepped back partially with the Asian crisis contagion. Third, partial progress was subsequently recorded due to economic recovery and new quite significant social reforms, moving closer to the lower inequality reached in the first half of the 1990s. Income distribution at present is less unequal than in the 1980s, but is more regressive than in the 1960s and early 1970s
The above results, however, should be viewed with caution. For an accurate measurement of income distribution, all different sources of income should be considered. However, income from capital is usually poorly measured, and this is also the case with the Chilean surveys. On the one hand, the Chilean employment survey focuses mainly on labour income. The CASEN datasets, on the other hand, attempt to measure social transfers and income from capital, but this last variable suffers from significant underreporting when national accounts are taken as a benchmark, thus making it difficult to impute figures at household levels. This limits the analysis of income distribution. As income from capital is most probably concentrated within wealthy families, our values underestimate the inequality level, and may bias the labour income share upward. This is an important limitation that needs to be considered in the interpretation of the data analysis.
The paper proceeds as follows: the evolution of inequality during the neoliberal reforms under the 1973-90 Pinochet dictatorship is presented in section 2. Next, the causes of the changes in inequality are examined. Section 3 covers the same analysis for the four centre-left democratic governments, 1 starting from 1990 up to the global crisis. Section 4 analyses the contagion of the global financial crisis, its effects on Chile and the country's policy responses. Section 5 offers concluding remarks.
Income inequality under the dictatorship: 1973-89

Changes in inequality
Income distribution experienced a sharp negative trend during the 1970s and 1980s (see Figure 1 ). Consistent, annual data from the University of Chile's Employment Survey for Santiago, available since 1957, show that the ratio of the rich/poor quintiles was 13 times (Gini=49) in the 1960s, worsened to 15 (Gini 52) in 1974-81, and to 20 (Gini=57) in the 1980s. In fact, income distribution between 1975 and 1987 worsened steadily, stabilized temporarily during the 1977-80 upswing, only to deteriorate again thereafter. Even more regressive results were evident in 1987, regardless of whether these were measured by the Gini coefficient or the ratio fifth/first quintiles.
This was essentially a reflection of four interrelated factors: (i) trade reforms strong in import liberalization and weaker in export promotion; (ii) labour reforms from 1973 onward that were strongly biased against workers and union organizations; (iii) great real macroeconomic instability, and (iv) a low ratio of investment per labour force member (signalling a negative impact on productivity for low-trained workers). 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 Income 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 National unemployment rate, 1960-2010 (% of the labourforce) Nevertheless, few social indicators did continue to improve during the Pinochet regime, although most experienced sharp reversal. The number of students enrolled in primary schools as a percentage of the population aged six-to-fourteen was already close to 100 per cent in 1973 while the proportion of 15-18-year olds at the secondary level climbed from 51 per cent in 1973 to 75 per cent in 1989. Also, infant mortality improved significantly as a result of public efforts to strengthen mother and child care that included nutrition programmes for infants, a decline in birthrates, and an improvement in the education of mothers (Monckeberg 1998; Raczynski and Oyarzo 1981) .
The worsening of income inequality was generated in particular by the labour markets (Table 1) . In the beginning, wages were adjusted with a significant underestimation of actual inflation. This was followed by the deep recession in 1975 which triggered a strong rise in unemployment ( Figure 2 ). Next came recovery in economic activity, employment and wages that continued until 1981, a second, deeper recession in 1982, only to be followed again by a recovery lasting until 1989. In all, real wages during the entire period averaged a mere 82 per cent of the average 1970 level. Unemployment affected on average 18 per cent of the labour force, with a peak of 31 per cent in 1987 (Ffrench-Davis 2010: 8) . By 1989, minimum and average wages were still about 8 per cent below the 1970 levels; the impact was compounded by increased wage inequality (discussed later). Similarly, family allowances continued to decline steadily until 1989 when they were 72 per cent below the 1970 level. Table 1 shows that per capita public social expenditure on education and health dropped substantially, 37 per cent and 30 per cent, respectively. Social security spending was the only one to rise due to the increasing numbers of pensioners, which absorbed the cuts made to average pensions. However, some social spending was targeted to society's poorest members, which appears to have partially compensated for the decline in their labour income. 2 Public social expenditures started to increase again only in 1991 after the return of democracy.
The data on the inequality of income distribution are supplemented with information from consumer spending surveys. Household budget surveys 3 (EPF), on which the CPI basket has been consecutively built, show a steady decline in household spending 
Decomposition of income inequality by source: 1973-89
Most of the literature on income distribution has concentrated on measuring income inequality and poverty indicators. However, in recent years, a number of studies have examined and measured the contribution of different sources of income in total inequality. The objective of such an approach is to understand the nature of income inequality by analysing whether total inequality is concentrated in certain specific income components. Thus, it is possible to measure the contribution of any income component to total income inequality.
The Gini coefficient, considered to be one of the best measures of inequality, has been widely used. Following Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) , this section presents a decomposition of the Gini index by sources of income for the 1973-89 period. We measure the contribution of the different sources of household income, assessing the relative importance of each on total inequality. In this section we use the University of Chile's employment survey. Total income is divided into two categories: (i) labour income, and (ii) other incomes (pensions, rent of capital, remittances, etc.). Each component of household income is normalized by household size; thus, the analysis is based on per capita income. Figure 3 shows the share of each income source in total household income between 1973 and 1989. Conditional on the potential data bias discussed earlier, labour was the major source in total income in Chile during the period in question. However, its share in total income declined from 90 per cent to 84 per cent during the relevant period, while other income increased from 10 to 16 per cent. These results highlight the importance of the labour market as the main source of income generation for households, and their limited access to other sources of income. The results also reflect the difficulty for measuring the return to capital. The evidence shows a high level of labour income inequality (Figure 4 ). The lowest value of labour Gini coefficient was in 1974, resulting from the policies implemented during the Allende government. 4 The average labour income Gini coefficient was 0.58 throughout the period, except for a peak of 0.64 in 1987. With respect to the 'other sources of income', the Gini coefficient was high and relatively stable during the period, averaging 0.88. These results are consistent with anti-worker labour reforms, i.e., limited union representation and minimum wage policies. In addition, the economy was subjected to a massive liberalization process. Once the economy opened up, there was a marked increase in the premium to higher education, resulting in a worsening of the wage-income distribution. The forces behind this change in relative prices were rooted in the relative declining demand for unskilled labour that was accelerated by the abrupt import liberalization and low productive investment. This worked in tandem with the greater human capital requirements in the economy after the neoliberal reforms. In addition, this tendency appeared to be associated with the global technological change that was transmitted via growing trade links with the rest of the world where wage inequality was also on the rise vis-à-vis the rather inflexible composition of the supply of human capital. At the same time, the productive structure was dominated in the 1980s by a natural resource-intensive export sector with little need for unskilled labour, while rest of the domestic economy was in a general slump. Finally, privatization of many public companies, high levels of unemployment during the military government, and large cuts to social spending and social services (Table 1) are also factors associated with Chile's high inequality.
The relative contribution of labour income in total inequality decreased almost in the same proportion as its share in total income. Whereas labour income's contribution to inequality was 91 per cent in 1973, this fell to 84 per cent in 1989. Indeed, labour income became more unequal in 1989 (0.58); its share (Sk) in total income dropped and its correlation (Rk) remained stable, resulting in a lower contribution in total inequality. According to these surveys, the harsh inequality of this period is mostly explained by the high levels of labour-market inequality and of unemployment. However, not only has open unemployment played a role in explaining this variation in inequality. Access to employment has also been a key factor. Although the employment rate averaged 47.5 per cent, it diverged significantly by income quintiles: 32 per cent for the poorest quintile and 62 per cent for the richest.
On the other hand, other income sources increased their contribution to inequality from 9 per cent in 1973 to 16 per cent in 1989. In addition, this share in total income and its Gini correlation (Rk) increased, leading to a higher contribution in total inequality, which indicates that other incomes favoured the rich more than the poor, adding to total inequality throughout the period.
To better understand this trend, we go on to examine labour income, broken down by gender and skilled/unskilled labour income. We defined skilled labour income as earnings received by individuals with more than 12 years of schooling and we considered unskilled labour income to constitute the wages of workers with 12 years of schooling or less. 5 Here we utilized data from 1965 to 1989 due to limitations on statistics for earlier years.
The evidence shows that the relative contribution of skilled labour income increased from 26 per cent in 1965 to 50 per cent in 1989, with a peak of 61 per cent in 1987. In contrast, the contribution of unskilled labour income decreased from 47 per cent in 1965 to 26 per cent in 1989. These results are explained largely by unequal human capital investment opportunities: (i) only a minority of the labour force had achieved more than 12 years of schooling (which was then the threshold denoting a break in the yield curve to school years); (ii) there were significant gaps in the quality of education among students from the different quintiles; (iii) labour training efforts were extremely weak and biased towards trained people, and (iv) the system of higher and professional education became even more retrogressive when public funding for universities was slashed in the 1980s and public institutions lost to private ones in importance. All these elements contributed to historical inequities continuing across generations. 6 The gender analysis is also informative. The share of skilled male labour income increased from 22 per cent in 1965 to 39 per cent in 1989, reaching its highest value of 49 per cent in 1987. The relative contribution of skilled female labour income to inequality also grew from 4 per cent in 1965 to 11 per cent in 1987. Moreover, the relative contribution of unskilled labour declined, from 36 per cent in 1965 to 12 per cent in 1989 for males and from 11 per cent to 6 per cent, respectively, for females.
In sum, there are three important observations in terms of total inequality. First, inequality became significantly higher with sharp fluctuations: the lowest inequality level was recorded in 1973 and the highest in 1987. Second, economic policies (labour market reforms, trade liberalization and the macroeconomic environment) played a significant role in this trend and its fluctuations. Third, skilled labour income is the main factor explaining the increased inequality over the period. Low quality education and unequal access to quality education add to this pattern.
Determinants of changes in inequality
Structural reforms had a regressive bias. On the one hand, there were massive, direct negative effects resulting from the adoption of a model that focused, amidst great inequality, on the neutrality of policies. On the other hand, failure to take the structural heterogeneity of agents into account--in conjunction with significant market failures and segmentation--translated into costly adjustment processes and severe recession that generated an environment of low productive investment and high unemployment. Thus these policies indirectly had a negative impact on the unprotected population, and triggered the sharp deterioration that took place between 1973 and 1989. Naturally, deterioration was compounded by the debt crisis, but the severity of its social and economic impacts was associated with the model adopted by the dictatorship.
Reforms to the tax system in 1975 included the elimination of wealth and capital gains taxes, and a substantial reduction of taxes on profits. On the other hand, the adoption of a value added tax was completed and existing exemptions for basic consumer goods were cancelled in an effort to reduce the tax burden and to concentrate on 'neutral' taxes. In 1984 a second sizable tax reform took place. The 40 per cent tax on reinvested profits was removed but a 10 per cent general tax on profits was retained. In addition, taxes paid at the firm by its owners were considered to constitute a credit towards personal progressive income tax. Later, extremely generous income tax privileges were created for the purchase of stock of firms being privatized. Finally, before the 1988 plebiscite, VAT was reduced from 20 per cent to 16 per cent, taxes on several luxury goods were reduced or suppressed, and in 1989 the remaining 10 per cent income tax was eliminated in the case of reinvestment of profits. The temporary high price of copper, collected by CODELCO (the public producer of copper) filled the vacuum left by the diminishing tax revenue.
The financial market reforms created momentum for short-term financial activism, but weaker support in long-term segments, with annual real interest rates averaging 38 per cent in 1975-82 (Ffrench-Davis 2010: ch. III). Increasing financial inflows steered the economy towards unsustainable current expenditures that culminated in the severe 1982 crisis and a long-lasting recession in subsequent years. The state had to intervene to avoid the collapse of its financial system. The high cost of subsidies to rescue the system and the borrowers (35 per cent of GDP) implied additional reductions in social spending and public sector investment in the 1980s. The investment record was extremely low during the 16-year period , significantly lower than in the 1960s. Thus domestic financial reforms had failed to finance new productive capacity, and capital inflows were associated with crowded-out national savings.
The trade reforms introduced in the mid-1970s are a key factor in explaining factorial income behaviour. Trade reforms, on the one hand, had a great impact on the production structure, which led to a significant relative decline in employment in some sectors (particularly in manufacturing). Although reform was accompanied by a positive but weaker dynamism in expanding exports, a subsequent, clear negative net effect on employment, productive investment and economic activity was recorded during the extensive transition period to import liberalization. This net negative balance was strengthened by the 1979-82 exchange rate appreciation and by the procyclical bias of macroeconomic policies (see Ffrench-Davis 2010: ch. II).
The privatization of many production units owned by the state took place after the mid1970s. Privatization was carried out during a period of domestic recession and extremely high domestic interest rates, hence, only a few private groups with greater access to external credit were able to bid for the enterprises, further strengthening the concentration of wealth and power (see Devlin and Cominetti 1994; Monckeberg 2001) .
Major changes in labour legislation also had negative impact on workers. The dismissal of workers was made easier, labour tribunals were abolished (but restored in 1986), and unions were suspended in September 1973. However, in 1979, unions were authorized, albeit with limited powers that excluded collective negotiations inter-firm, restricted the rights of union leaders, and fomented the segmentation of labour unions (Mizala and Romaguera 2001) . Legislation, in the context of political repression and economic depression, was effective in reducing the power of social organizations and their ability to defend their rights (Tokman 2004 ).
In the early 1980s, structural changes culminated in the creation of a dual health care system: a public component that operated through a common national fund (Fondo Nacional de Salud, FONASA) and a private component that consisted of health insurance firms (ISAPRES). At that time, health care was, to a large extent, financed through the payroll tax. The reform initially meant that 11 per cent of the beneficiaries transferred to the new ISAPRES system with 48 per cent of the revenue from health contributions (Titelman 2001 ).
This regressive bias in the access to public services was also observed in other sectors. During the 1980s, the dictatorship implemented a sweeping education reform package. First, the government decentralized the administration of public schools, transferring responsibility for school management from the ministry of education to municipal governments, where maximum authority was invested with the mayor. Second, the government changed the mechanism for funding. Public schools continued to be funded by the ministry, but municipalities received a per-student voucher for every child attending school within their jurisdiction. As a result, enrolment losses began to have a direct effect on municipal education budgets. Private schools that did not charge tuition also received the same per-student voucher as public schools. Elite private institutions that charged tuition continued to operate without public funding. After the voucher reform was introduced, education has become increasingly privatized. According to the OECD, Chile is among the countries with higher levels of educational segregation. In sum, several reforms instigated during this period promoted segregation in the Chilean society.
Private pension fund management companies (Administradoras de Fondos Previsionales, AFPs) began to operate in 1981 in an abrupt transition from a pay-asyou-go system to an individual capitalization one. There are three negative features to be emphasized here. First, the reform led to a decline in public revenue as revenue was transferred to the AFPs while the public sector was left with the responsibility for financing current and future pensions. Consequently, the public social security deficit rose from 2 per cent of GDP in 1980 to 7 per cent in 1983-86 (Uthoff 2001) . Second, the reform was unsuccessful in including lower-income, informal or self-employed workers. In 1988 only 55 per cent of the working people were contributing to either pension system. Third, another significant distributive implication was the enormous concentration of power in the hands of AFP owners, who used worker funds to acquire shares and strong voice in appointing directors to the corporation boards. This meant no voice for the actual owners of the funds.
Structural reforms coincided with the two deep crises of 1975 and 1982. Reforms and policies implemented during dictatorship increased Chile's vulnerability to external shocks, exacerbating the severe crises the country faced in 1975 and 1982. Among the worst consequences of the resulting recessions were the leaps in domestic unemployment. By 1975, unemployment had risen to 17.6 per cent of the labour force (including those enrolled in emergency programmes) and this figure had jumped to 31.3 per cent by 1983. 7 The problem was later eased somewhat by the recovery of economic activity, but the return to single-digit unemployment rates did not occur until 1989, when open unemployment was 8 per cent. The erosion of income distribution is easily explained by the fact that unemployment had hit the lowest income groups the hardest, and weakened public social networks.
3 Income distribution and poverty after the return to democracy, 1990 to late 2008
Changes in inequality
Four periods with different socioeconomic outcomes can be distinguished from 1990 onward. During the first years (1990-95), there were significant real improvements in average and minimum wages and in social expenditure. In parallel, employment, social security coverage and labour participation increased steadily. The macroeconomic environment, with factors of production (labour and capital) operating close to full employment, provided a significant progressive equity dividend. In the second period (1996-98), progress in poverty reduction slowed and wages experienced smaller increases, although other social indicators kept improving. In the third period (since 1999) which encompasses a reappearing recessive output gap, the environment worsened, causing a sharp rise in unemployment and a noticeable moderation in poverty reduction (CASEN 2000 (CASEN , 2003 ; see also Figure 5 ). However, the minimum wage, which is proposed annually by the government to Parliament, rose significantly with the establishment of a triennial programme for 1998-2000. Similarly, teachers and workers in national health service received special raises, as did public pensions. The associated higher fiscal expenditure was duly financed through additional tax revenue. (summarized in Figure 5 ), show that steady progress has been made in this area. The results provided by the income data from the University of Chile's employment survey for Santiago are consistent with those from the INE household survey. The best-known indicator, the CASEN survey, showed an increase between 1987 and 1992 in the monetary income share of the poorest quintile of households and a decrease in the share of the richest quintile. From that time onward, however, the survey depicted ups-and-downs. Still by 1996, all available data, ranked both by household and by per capita income, showed an improvement in the poorest 40 per cent of households (and, in most cases, in quintile I) and a reduced share in the richest. In the same year, the Gini index improved in all cases in comparison to 1987 (Feres 2001) . In 1998 when the longlasting recessive adjustment was started, a minor worsening was observed with respect to the 1996 survey, persisting into the 2000 survey as well. The 2003 CASEN survey, capturing the start of economic recovery, revealed some distributive improvements, and the trend became accentuated in the following years. Consequently, in the 2006 CASEN, the ratio between the richest and the poorest quintile had diminished to 13.1 times, from 14.4 times in 2000 (the Gini improved from 0.58 to 0.54 over the same years).
Finally, there has been a significant increase of the 'investment in people' since 1990. These efforts take time to be felt. For example, income distribution, when corrected for non-monetary items, improved considerably (based on total per capita income and total per capita income plus in-kind subsidies), and bridged the gap between the richest and poorest quintile from 20 to 11 times in the 1998 CASEN survey. 11 Social spending rose significantly under democracy (see Table 1 ), and the key question is determining whether the additional allocation actually led to an increase in the volume and/or quality of services, or whether the same services were merely provided at greater cost to the state. 12 In the case of education, the number of years of schooling has increased sharply as reported here, but its quality and distribution needs critical improvement. 13 Despite vigorous economic growth, particularly in the 1990s, Chilean per capita income (in PPP) is still about one-third of that in most developed economies, and income inequality is notably higher. Furthermore, the Chilean economy needs to improve its social protection model by significantly reducing the extreme level of segregation. After four centre-left governments, Chile maintains a dual social system, among others, in health, education and housing. Thus, the political model of 'growth with equity' that has been promoted since the return to democracy has not been able to close the social gaps.
11 The 1998 CASEN survey considered the imputed value of educational and health services, and housing subsidies (monetary transfers such as pensions of non-contributory seniors, family allowances and unemployment insurance) (Bravo Contreras 2004) .
12 A substantial share of the increase in social spending in the 1990s was directed to raising the wages of teachers and national health system personnel, which in 1990 were extremely out of line with the market and below the minimum required for efficient functioning. Unfortunately, the quality of services had fallen as a result of the decline in wages and in the social status of these public servants in the 1980s, and the improvement in salaries was not automatically followed by a recovery in quality. This was particularly evident in the case of education where there was a huge increase in the number of students in secondary and higher education levels.
13 Labour training can contribute significantly to promote the flexibility of the labour supply. There was some moderate progress in this field since the 1990s. Nonetheless, inequities remain, as pointed out by the Consejo Asesor Presidencial de Trabajo y Equidad (2008). In fact, 1 per cent of firms captured 42 per cent of the public subsidy, with 80 per cent going to large firms.
Decomposition of income inequality by source: 1990-2009
In this section, a decomposition of income inequality by source between 1990 and 2009 is carried out. Acknowledging data shortcomings, we decompose total income in labour income and monetary transfers from the government and others sources of income as given in the CASEN. Utilizing the Employment Survey from the Universidad de Chile, we decompose total income in labour income and other income as in the previous analysis (Section 2.2). In order to examine the main factors driving the changes in inequality, decomposition is made for skilled and unskilled workers disaggregated by gender.
Thus, we have two datasets for this period which provide better information for examining inequality and its determinants. But we still face two important limitations which should be considered in any interpretation of the results. First, income from capital is poorly measured in both datasets. Therefore, given that capital is mainly appropriated by high-income households, our results significantly underestimate the magnitude of inequality. Second, only monetary transfers are measured in the CASEN datasets. The government provides other types of in-kind transfers such as health, education and housing that are not included in total household income, and this limits the extent of the analysis. According to CASEN, the evidence indicates a high level of labour income inequality ( Figure 6 ), with the Gini averaging 0.59 during 1990 to 2009. 14 We observe an increase reaching 0.62 in this coefficient during 2000, while the lowest Gini coefficient (0.58) is in 2006. These results are consistent with the Asian crisis impact on the labour market and policies implemented by the government in the 2000s. As is expected, there is a strong positive correlation between labour income and total household income.
The analysis of monetary transfers also reveals an unequal distribution, with a Gini coefficient of about 0.75 during the period examined, but the nature of this inequality was quite different. There is a negative correlation between total household income and monetary transfers; in other words, poorest households received higher transfers, thus reducing income inequality.
On the other hand, the results indicate a high level of inequality for other income sources. As with the previous cases, this source remained relatively stable during the period 1990-2009, with the average Gini coefficient 0.70. At the same time, the results reveal that its correlation with total income is positive. Using the previous decomposition approach, labour income ( Figure 7 ) exhibits a greater relative contribution to total inequality: 74 per cent in 1990, rising to 86 per cent in 2009.
The second major factor contributing to inequality is the other sources of income, which reached 26 per cent during the 1990s and decreased to 15 per cent in 2009. To the contrary to what has been said, monetary transfers work to reduce inequality.
The extent to which income sources may affect the level of total inequality is of particular interest to policymakers. 
The determinants of changes
In the 1990s public spending was restructured to increase funding in social areas in parallel with fiscal reform that reduced tax evasion, raised progressive taxation and the VAT rate. In the labour market, the reforms led to a substantial improvement in minimum wages and reduced somewhat the imbalance of power between workers and employers. Furthermore, in the early 1990s innovative social programmes were introduced, such as the prioritization of elementary schools in poor zones and young labour training (Raczynski 1996) . During the first decade of the 2000s, three ambitious more comprehensive programmes were implemented which directly benefited the poorest households: the Chile Solidario, 16 the gradual health reform AUGE, and a notable social security reform.
In addition, the significant reforms concerning macroeconomic management in the first half of the 1990s had a major positive effect on productive employment and wages. The introduction of the unremunerated reserve requirement and other prudential mechanisms for regulating volatile capital inflows played a key role in achieving sustainability of macroeconomic balances and the 7 per cent average GDP annual growth in 1990-98 (Ffrench-Davis 2010: ch. VIII).
The result of this set of policies was a substantial growth in the real average wage that was 41 per cent higher in 1998 than a decade earlier, and minimum wage jumped 63 per cent. Reflecting the contagion of the Asian crisis, the recessive adjustment initiated in 1998 weakened the growth of wages. Nevertheless, average real wage in 2009 exceeded its 1989 level by 75 per cent, and minimum wages had increased 129 per cent in the same period. Family allowances had almost tripled, which meant that nearly 90 per cent of the fall recorded in the 1980s had been recovered (see Table 1 ). Per capita public expenditure in education and health, multiplied by 4.2 times over the years 1990-2009 (implying 7 per cent annual average growth), was strongly directed towards regaining the wage levels that had been notably reduced in the 1980s. The unemployment rate also improved considerably, averaging 8. Two positive trends in the labour market need to be underlined. One is the rising share of workers in the formal segment, as reflected by the numbers contributing to social security. Prior to democracy, few workers were enrolled in the private social security scheme created by the dictatorship in 1981. By 1989 still only 41 per cent of the labour force made monthly contributions. The trend continued to rise, with 46 per cent active by the mid-1990s. However, stagnation followed, lasting until 2004 when worker interest was rekindled in tandem with the recovery of economic activity and a legal reform enforcing some formalization of the labour market, 17 and the share climbed to 56 per cent by 2009. Another outstanding trend is the increase in the participation of women in the labour force, as documented below.
The increasing coverage of the new unemployment insurance for private workers was a remedy against the effects of unemployment. Previously, only an unemployment subsidy of a negligible amount had existed. Severance pay was equivalent to one month's wage for each year on the job with the same employer (with a 11-year limit) and for specific dismissal circumstances. It was relevant mostly for organized workers with steady jobs. The new insurance scheme, becoming effective in October 2002, included two separate funds. One fund is financed through worker and employer contributions, which are credited to the individual account of the worker while the contribution of the employer (1.6 per cent of the wage, in the event of a contract without a timelimit) is credited against the severance liability of the employer. The second is a solidarity fund, which is financed by the government (with a designated annual lumpsum) and contributions by the employer (0.8 per cent of the assessable wage). All private wage earners who had signed new contracts were enrolled in the new system. After seven years in effect (by September 2009), the scheme had 6.2 million registered members (workers who at some point in time had been enrolled in the new system). Of these, 3.2 million were active contributors (about 85 per cent of AFP active private sector contributors). This implies that less than one-in-five waged worker had retained or stayed on the job during the 7-year period. The mechanism had started to operate during a period of relatively high unemployment, mostly as self-insurance.
During the seven year period when the insurance was in force, the economy averaged about 600,000 unemployed, and a large number of workers took advantage of the scheme. Approximately 4.8 million benefits were delivered. The huge number of compensation cases reflected the precariousness or actual flexibility of the labour market. But the compensation received, covering an average of 2.5 months per case, was quite small and consisted almost entirely of self-financed contributions made during the worker's term of employment. In turn, up to 2008, only 3 per cent of the paid benefits were supplemented by the solidarity fund. In all, notwithstanding the fact that the insurance scheme was created during an economic downturn, the two funds had 17 President Lagos enacted legislation demanding large firms to take responsibility for the fulfilment of labour contracts and payment of social security by their sub-contractors (Ley de Sub-contratación).
accumulated stocks equivalent to more than 1 per cent of GDP. Actually, the scheme had pro-cyclical effect, given that it accumulated funds during recessive years.
The unemployment insurance, despite its relevant progress, needed substantial adjustments to (i) the magnitude of the benefits; (ii) access to benefits; (iii) the extent of the solidarity fund; (iv) its macroeconomic impact, and (v) the link to effective training programmes, with the receipt of solidarity benefits conditional on effective participation. In 2009 the parliament approved a government proposal that enhanced the coverage of and access to the solidarity fund. This gave access to workers with shortterm contracts, introduced countercyclical features in the benefits, and sought to improve job-seeking intermediation for the unemployed and to provide access to labour training.
Social expenditure has had a progressive element since the 1990s, and accounts for the poor's improved access to free or subsidized goods and services. More recently, sizable programmes are in progress, which means significant flows of monetary transfers. In fact, a major reform of the pension scheme has been under way since 2008, with the objective of changing the balance of the 1981 reform from a basically private selfinsurance system to one with an ambitious solidarity pillar (discussed in the next section).
Social policies--together with the more efficient macroeconomic management that laid the foundation in the 1990s for faster growth and large-scale job creation--enabled the drastic reduction of poverty, and some modest improvements to the highly distorted income distribution inherited from the dictatorship in 1990.
The global crisis and post-crisis period 18
Prior to the global crisis, Chile had benefited from notably high copper prices that allowed the treasury to accumulate a sizable stabilization fund ( 
The determinants of changes
Fiscal policy took the lead in countercyclical policies. There was a 20 per cent drop in tax revenue reflecting the sluggish domestic demand, depressed copper prices and the short-term tax reductions (on fuels, loans, SMEs). At the same time, expenditure was increased 17 per cent. Consequently, fiscal policy significantly alleviated the impact of the negative external shocks on the domestic market, supporting a rather vigorous recovery already by the last quarter of 2009.
In 2009, the government implemented a series of social policies in order to mitigate the negative effects on the most vulnerable population groups, based on a poverty rate of 15.1 per cent (rather than the 19 per cent mentioned above). It is clear that the temporary setback in the fight against poverty would have been much worse had mitigation policies not been introduced by the Bachelet administration during the crisis. A key element of the contingency plan was the granting of two vouchers valued at CLP40,000 (approximately US$80, equivalent to approximately one-third of the monthly net minimum wage) for each dependent member in lowest-income families.
In addition, wide-reaching efforts were undertaken to improve the pension system through a reform launched in 2008 (prior to the crisis; see Arenas 2010) . 19 The process started progressively with household members from the two poorest quintiles, gradually expanding to encompass three quintiles by 2011. Its improvements included (i) a higher basic pension for those who, in 2008, were 64 years or older; (ii) complementary subsidy, gradually decreasing and ultimately leading to a pension equivalent to more or less 1.5 times the minimum wage; (iii) a subsidy equivalent to the value of social security contributions for two years for formal sector workers until the age of 35; and (iv) support, per child, for mothers on retirement. In addition, the reform enabled a public AFP to be created alongside with the private AFPs, a proposal strongly disputed by the opposition. The government did not make use of the 'policy space' gained.
On the other hand, the country's largest state-owned corporation, the National Copper Corporation (CODELCO), capitalized US$1 billion in order to finance its investment projects, and the capital of the Banco Estado (the public bank) increased by 50 per cent. The aim of this measure was to foster lending to small businesses.
In order to finance the resulting fiscal deficit, the treasury withdrew the equivalent of 4.7 per cent of GDP from its sovereign funds in 2009. That countercyclical behaviour coincided with the spectacular (procyclical) outflows by residents, mainly pension fund companies, bringing net capital outflows in 2009 to 2.1 per cent of the GDP, in spite of the 4.7 per cent fiscal inflows.
The central bank was slow to launch measures for monetary relaxation. It was not until January 2009 that the central bank undertook the reduction of the monetary policy rate in a process that brought the rate to 0.25 per cent in July. Over the course of the year, financing of foreign commerce and large corporations normalized. Cost of loans to SMEs, however, remained high and bank profits were also quite high.
The external surplus was recovered by late 2009 as a result of a rebound in copper prices and a strong drop in the domestic demand for imports. Once the greatest uncertainty was over, copper prices returned to their historically high levels, exceeding US$4 per pound.
During the year, the sharp negative external shock was increasingly compensated by the progressive strengthening of fiscal policy. The recessive gap that had existed in 2008 plus the 1.7 per cent drop in GDP in 2009 led to significant space for increases in effective GDP in addition to generating new capacity or potential GDP, duly adjusted by the destruction caused by the intense earthquake of 27 February 2010.
During the last quarter of 2009, the revitalizing boost became dominant, leading to economic recovery that bounced from -2.9 per cent (as of the third quarter of 2009) to nearly 4 per cent. This was temporarily but significantly halted by the earthquake, as economic activity by March 2010 had dropped 2.3 per cent (in twelve months). During the four quarters ending September 2009, domestic demand grew by double digits, sustaining a recovery of GDP that reached a growth rate of nearly 7 per cent, given productive capacity that was close to 5 per cent per year. But despite the recovery of the economic activity and the loss of capacity caused by the earthquake, there was still a gap between actual GDP and potential GDP to be utilized in 2011.
The drop in GDP in 2009 was linked to a decrease in exports, but its repercussions for the domestic economy were less damaging. While export volumes continued to be depressed, production for the domestic market sustained vigorous recovery in 2010 (see Ffrench-Davis and Heresi 2011) , and this is where unemployment was concentrated. The recovery of economic activity led to an increase in capital formation, compensating for the dips registered in 2009.
In general, all imports increased notably as a result of the expansion in aggregate demand and a persistent sharp exchange rate appreciation. In fact, between 2003 and 2010, the dynamism that had been seen earlier in export volumes dropped steadily. This trend was most significant in manufactured exports, more value-added intensive.
The economy has increasingly accommodated a real exchange rate that is consistent with copper prices far exceeding its historic average as well as its likely long-term sustainable level. High prices have been explicitly internalized in fiscal accounts via notable increases in the long-term prices considered in the structural budget. 20 Furthermore, the exchange rate has faced additional pressure as a result of growing capital inflows due to the differential between domestic and international interest rates.
In short, the continuation of a free-free exchange rate policy implies renouncing the development of sustainable macroeconomic policies with demand regulated to levels close to the productive frontier and with 'correct' macro-prices. In a context of massive and volatile capital flows and highly variable terms of trade, a totally free exchange rate fluctuates notably without settling around a sustainable trend. Such volatility discourages (i) the generation of value-added to natural resources, (ii) the access of SMEs to export markets, (iii) the survival of national industries crowded-out by artificially cheap imports and preservation of the jobs they generate, (iv) productive investment in tradable areas and (v) efforts to take advantage of the opportunities offered by trade agreements. In order to regain growth with equity, Chile must recover its capacity to maintain the equilibriums of the real macroeconomy.
Conclusions and remaining challenges
This analysis documents Chile's remarkable changes in income distribution and poverty. We have stressed the significant role played by socioeconomic reforms, its corrections and setbacks over the last four decades. The net outcome since the 1970s shows a highly skewed income distribution in Chile. Nevertheless, over time there have been strong fluctuations. Although income distribution worsened notably in the 1970s-80s, a significant improvement was recorded in the first half of the 1990s, resulting from better economic and social policies in democracy than in dictatorship. Subsequently, however, a long-lasting recessive adjustment took place across the economy in 1999-2003, with an increase in unemployment, a delay in the reduction of poverty, and some worsening of income distribution. Then in 2004-08, the recovery of economic activity and a noticeable increase in progressive social reforms partly offset the global crisis, and improved distribution in 2004-09, but only to regain the level achieved during the first years of democracy's return in the 1990s.
Three key variables are behind these diverse outcomes and correspond to (i) the size and allocation of social expenditure which is still constrained today by the low tax burden; 21 (ii) the macroeconomic environment, and (iii) how account is taken of the structural heterogeneity prevailing in the domestic market and of the unfavourable environment in which SMEs operate.
The production process itself has strong effects on poverty and income distribution. The generation of productive employment is one main channel through which economic and social progress is transmitted. Policies intended to strengthen the demand for labour, to reduce gender and training gaps, and to make the supply more flexible and better able to adapt to technological changes--in association with sustainable macroeconomic stability, vigorous physical capital formation, a strong pull to innovation, and increasing investment in people--play a significant role in improving the distribution of opportunities.
Effective action requires a comprehensive shift from 'neutral' policies (that actually are biased in favour of the upper income segments) towards strongly biased policies that improve the productivity and workability of middle-and low-income segments of society. The required financing should come from a higher effective tax burden on the upper percentiles of income where the ownership of capital is notably concentrated. It is clear that the choice is not between growth and equity. Rather, the key issue is to identify the determinants of growth, which, in the context of Chile's present stage of development, encompass crucial complementarities between the sources of growth and equity.
Chile achieved unprecedented economic growth during most of the 1990s. This growth was sustained by a notorious expansion of capital formation and an increase in productive capacity. At the same time, employment and salaries rose steadily, and some improvement was achieved in income distribution. A coherent macroeconomic approach was a key ingredient of these achievements. During the years that followed, economic growth slowed markedly but the social agenda intensified in an innovative manner. However, the reinforced social agenda did not match with that of productive development. Chile's modest economic growth since the Asian financial crisis is clearly due to (i) a series of shortcomings in macroeconomic policies after the country distanced itself from the path that allowed sustained and more equitable growth in the 1990s, moving from 'productivism' to 'financierism', and (ii) weaknesses and contradictions in microeconomic policies, including the absence of productive development policies.
The message for economic policy is that macroeconomic responsibility is related not only to low inflation and fiscal discipline, but also to the recessive or expansive environment of the domestic economy, and to key macro-prices such as the exchange and interest rates, which asymmetrically affect small and medium firms versus large corporations; traditional versus non-traditional exporters; workers with low qualifications versus highly-qualified workers. Indeed, the macroeconomic environment has a substantial impact on both growth and equity.
Equity and growth capacity also depend upon specific sectoral policies: how trade, financial and tax reforms are designed and executed. These three reforms, implemented with a neoliberal approach in the 1970s, left regressive tracks that contribute to our understanding of why they were associated with low productive investment ratios and deteriorating income distribution.
The challenge is to grow while contributing to equity in the productive process, that is, distributing capacity to operate efficiently in the markets, particularly for small and medium firms and for workers with lesser qualifications. It is in these sectors where the large income and productivity gaps are located. It is in these sectors of the Chilean economy that there is broad room for efficiency gains. Then, growth-with-equity would become attainable.
In brief, to regain strong development convergence, there must be an active macroeconomic policy focused on the real economy ('productivism'), functioning near the productive frontier (or potential GDP). In parallel to the corrections made to the macroeconomic approach, profound microeconomic reforms should take place. These include structural reforms in (i) capital markets, developing long-term financing channels for small businesses; (ii) radical progress in labour training given that the important advances that have been made in school coverage have been accompanied by a deterioration in the overall quality of education; and (iii) vigorous public support for innovation, generating conditions for a boom in small businesses and the emergence of new entrepreneurs and productive activities.
This long-term challenge has been addressed eagerly since the return to democracy, but with inconsistencies. Although considerable progress has been made in reducing poverty, and there has been some improvement in income distribution, this still poses a major challenge.
